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I. INTRODUCTION
The estate tax1 applies to property2 transferred3 at death4 and to
property transferred during life, typically to a trust, under circumstances
in which the transferor5 retains an interest or power.6 These interests and
powers typically allow her to continue using or enjoying the property,
1. 26 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2210 (2012). The estate tax is an excise tax levied on the privilege of
transferring property at death. See CHARLES L. B. LOWNDES, ROBERT KRAMER & JOHN H.
MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 1.1, at 1 (3d ed. 1974) (“The accepted legal
convention in the case of a death tax is that the tax is the price of the privilege of transmitting
property at death. Although the tax is measured by the property transferred at death, the formal
subject of the tax is the transfer of the property, rather than the property itself.”); see also Hunter v.
United States, 474 F. Supp. 763, 765 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (“The federal estate tax is a tax imposed
upon the privilege of transferring property at one’s death.”). Although the estate tax is typically
justified on the ground that it lessens the accumulation of dynastic wealth, it can also be justified as
a source of revenue for distributive purposes or the provision of publicly-provided goods and
services. See, e.g., Kelly A. Moore, Proposal for Estate Tax Exclusion Provisions, 35 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 37, 40-41 (2009) (“Although current estate tax proponents rely primarily on the rationale of
breaking up large concentrations of wealth to justify the estate tax, the estate tax was used initially
by a federal government determined to raise revenue. . . . Despite the revenue-raising rationale that
gave rise to the estate tax, the stronger historic and long-stated primary purpose . . . has been to
break up large concentrations of wealth.”). The extent to which the estate tax accomplishes either of
these goals is debatable and frequently debated. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and
Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines, 43 TAX L. REV. 241, 242-43 (1988) (“As currently imposed,
federal taxes on the transmission of wealth produce little revenue and do not meaningfully
redistribute wealth.”).
2. The term “property” is construed broadly for estate tax purposes and includes “all
property, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, and wherever situated, beneficially owned
by the decedent at the time of his death.” Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(a) (as amended in 1963).
3. The term “transfer” is defined for gift tax purposes as “any transaction in which an
interest in property is gratuitously passed or conferred upon another, regardless of the means or
device employed . . . .” Treas. Reg. 25.2511-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1997). Given the close
connection between the gift and estate tax systems, two leading commentators conclude that “the
same breadth of construction is appropriate in applying the estate tax,” as well. 5 BORIS I. BITTKER
& LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 126.3.2, at 126-11,
126-12 (2d ed. 1993); see also Church v. United States, No. SA-97-CA-0774-OG, 2000 WL
206374, at *8, (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2000) (stating the term “transfer” is given the same meaning in
the two transfer tax regimes).
4. See 26 U.S.C. § 2033 (“The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.”). Section 2033 is
typically understood as requiring inclusion of property that would be included in the decedent’s
probate estate under state law. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1965) (“Sections
2033 and 2034 are concerned mainly with interests in property passing through the decedent’s
probate estate. Section 2033 includes in the decedent’s gross estate any interest that the decedent
has in property at the time of his death.”).
5. This article focuses on lifetime transfers of property that have deathtime consequences. In
the context of these lifetime transfers, the person transferring property to a trust is characterized as a
“transferor” or “grantor.” Each such transferor or grantor is ultimately a decedent whose estate is
subject to estate taxation on some or all of the property previously transferred during life.
6. These retained interests and powers are colloquially referred to as “strings” because the
transfer “comes with strings attached.”
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including receipt of any income generated by it; determine who, from
among a universe of potential beneficiaries, will use or enjoy the
property, including receipt of any income generated by it, at what times
and in what amounts; or reclaim the property depending upon how
future events unfold.7 The presence of these strings – or, more
accurately, the ability to pull them – draws some or all of the
encumbered property back into the transferor’s gross estate8 at death for
estate tax purposes.9
To the surprise of some (and the dismay of others), these lifetime
transfers are often deemed sufficiently complete to require gift taxation
when made but sufficiently incomplete to justify additional estate
taxation at death – meaning that the same transfer can be viewed quite
differently by the two transfer tax systems10 and subject to taxation
under both.11 The methodology for calculating the estate tax eliminates

7. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2036-2038.
8. The gross estate is defined for this purpose as “all property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible, wherever situated.” 26 U.S.C. § 2031(a).
9. See Estate of Farrel v. United States, 553 F.2d 637, 640 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (identifying
“Congress’ over-all purpose to gather into the estate tax all transfers which remain significantly
incomplete – on which the transferor still holds a string – during his lifetime.”).
10. A lifetime transfer is deemed “incomplete” for gift tax purposes when the transferor
retains dominion and control over the property such that she can change the disposition for her own
benefit or for the benefit of others. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b)-(c) (as amended in 1999). A
lifetime transfer is deemed “incomplete” for estate tax purposes when the transferor retains
dominion and control over the property such that she can change the disposition for her own benefit
or for the benefit of others; when the transferor retains the right to use the property (including the
right to vote corporate stock) or to receive the income generated by it; and when the transferor
retains a reversionary interest of a particular value and, by virtue of the presence of this reversionary
interest, suspends another’s enjoyment of the property until her death. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2036-2038.
Cf. Estate of Sulovich v. Comm’r, 587 F.2d 845, 849 (6th Cir. 1978) (“A literal reading of §§ 2036
and 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code mandates that any property transferred by a decedent be
included in his gross estate where the decedent retains any power of control. This principle applies
even though the transfer takes the form of an ostensibly completed gift.”).
11. The gift tax is an excise tax on the privilege of transferring property during life. See Treas.
Reg. § 25.2511-2(a) (as amended in 1999). The gift tax is frequently characterized as a backstop for
the estate tax and income tax. See David D. Joulfaian, The Federal Gift Tax: History, Law and
Economics, 1 (Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Working Paper No. 100, 2007),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/ota100.pdf
(“It is noteworthy that the gift tax was not enacted for its direct revenue yield. Rather, it was
introduced as a protective measure to minimize estate and income tax avoidance.”). The gift tax
results in “an exaction on lifetime transfers that take property which might otherwise be subject to
tax at death, out of the estate.” RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION
¶ 9.01, at 9-2 (6th ed. 1991). A determination that a transfer satisfies the requirements of a gift, and
is therefore subject to gift taxation, does not insulate the transfer from subsequent estate taxation.
Id.; see also JAMES B. LEWIS, THE ESTATE TAX § 1.6, at 12 (4th ed. 1979) (“Because the two taxes
are not uniform in their concepts of what is a completed transfer, a transfer of property during life
may be subject to gift tax when made and to estate tax upon the transferor’s subsequent death.”).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 1

458

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:455

the possibility of “double” taxation, but this begs the question whether
there is a simpler way to tax some (or all) of these transfers. Moreover,
the portions of the estate tax that draw these lifetime transfers into the
gross estate – Sections 2036, 2037 and 2038 of the Internal Revenue
Code12 – do not comprise a coherent scheme for deathtime taxation of
earlier transfers that came with strings attached. Instead, they are hastilydrawn, ad hoc responses to the perceived shortcomings of judicial
decisions construing other portions of the estate tax. As a result, they
occasionally apply to the same interest, at the same time, but yield
widely disparate tax consequences.13 Against this backdrop, calls for
reform are not surprising (although they rarely agree on the appropriate
corrective).14
This Article takes a more sanguine approach: it acknowledges the
utility of certain portions of these provisions to a functioning transfer tax
system, but ultimately concludes that the current statutory scheme is
overbroad in reach, clumsy in application, and therefore should be
replaced with a single, stand-alone provision. Such a provision would
require inclusion of property irrevocably transferred during life in which
(a) the transferor retains an economic interest in the property, such as the
right to use the property or to receive the income generated by the
property, (b) the transferor pays gift tax at the time of transfer on less
than the full fair market value of the property and (c) the retained
interest does not constitute a “qualified interest,” or involve the use of a
“personal residence,” as those terms are used in Section 2702 of the

12. 26 U.S.C. §§ 2036-2038.
13. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1965) (“It should be noted that
there is a considerable overlap in the application of sections 2036 through 2038 with respect to
reserved powers, so that transferred property may be includible in the decedent’s gross estate in
varying degrees under more than one of those sections.”). In the event of overlap, the provision that
results in the largest inclusion in the gross estate prevails. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 11, ¶
1.02[2][b], at 1-8.
14. See generally ABA Task Force on Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, Report on Reform of
Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, 58 TAX LAW. 93 (2004) (arguing that transferors should be given a
choice whether to be taxed under the gift tax system or the estate tax system or, alternatively,
treating all such transfers as completed gifts when made and thus subject to gift taxation alone); K.
Jay Holdsworth et al., Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 395 (1988) (ABA task
force recommending repeal of the gift tax as applied to transfers with retained interests, thus
delaying taxation until death, on the ground that the standard for determining the “completeness” of
a transfer should be the same for gift and estate tax purposes); Dodge, supra note 1, at 242-44
(arguing that taxation should be delayed until death so that the value of the transferred property can
be accurately measured). See also Joseph Isenbergh, Simplifying Retained Life Interests, Revocable
Transfers, and the Marital Deduction, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1984) (arguing that Sections 2036,
2037 and 2038 “are now little more than sources of unnecessary complexity and could therefore be
repealed without creating substantial new possibilities of tax avoidance.”).
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Internal Revenue Code.15 Put simply, this Article advocates limiting
inclusion to lifetime transfers to which Section 2036(a)(1) currently
applies but only when the transferor values her retained interest at an
amount other than zero for purposes of calculating the applicable gift tax
except when the retained interest can be accurately measured on an
actuarial basis.16
In addition, this Article advocates, by extension, that lifetime
transfers in which the transferor retains control of the beneficial interests
of others (such as the ability to designate additional or different
beneficiaries or to determine the amounts that each might receive) but
relinquishes all financial advantage for herself should be treated as
completed gifts when made and thus subject only to gift taxation on the
fair market value of the property at the time of transfer.17
Finally, the Article advocates retention of Section 2037(a), albeit in
truncated form and without any threshold requirement regarding the
value of the reversionary interest as a condition on inclusion, because the
presence of a reversionary interest – however contingent it may be and
however de minimis its value may seem – prevents the transferor from
washing her hands of the property from an economic perspective. In
short, this Article advocates retention of Sections 2036(a)(1) and
2037(a), with certain modifications, and repeal of the remainder of

15. Section 2702(a)(1) provides that “[s]olely for purposes of determining whether a transfer
of an interest in trust to (or for the benefit of) a member of the transferor’s family is a gift (and the
value of such transfer), the value of any interest in such trust retained by the transferor . . . shall be
determined as provided in paragraph (2).” 26 U.S.C. §2702(a)(1). Section 2702(a)(2) provides, in
turn, that the “value of any retained interest which is not a qualified interest shall be treated as being
zero.” Id. § 2702(a)(2)(A). Section 2702(b) then defines these “qualified interests” as including,
among other things, “any interest which consists of the right to receive fixed amounts payable not
less frequently than annually” and also “any interest which consists of the right to receive amounts
which are payable not less frequently than annually and are a fixed percentage of the fair market
value of the property in the trust . . . .” Id. § 2702(b)(1)-(2). The Treasury Regulations define
“personal residence trusts” and “qualified personal residence trusts” as those trusts holding one
asset, a residence, that will be used as a personal residence of the individual possessing a term
interest; in many circumstances, the transferor herself. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5(b)(1), (c)(1) (as
amended in 1997).
16. 26 U.S.C. § 2702. These accurately valued interests include, for example, the right to
receive, not less frequently than annually, a stated dollar amount or a fixed fraction or percentage of
the initial fair market value of the property. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(ii) (as amended in
2003).
17. This latter point is not novel. The Treasury Department recommended treating the
retention of the ability to control others’ beneficial interests as completed gifts subject to gift
taxation, but not estate taxation, thirty years ago. See 2 U. S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT: TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 375, 379 (1984),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/tres84v2C19.pdf.
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Sections 2036 and 2037 and the entirety of Section 2038.18
This approach to transfer taxation is preferable for three primary
reasons. First, it promotes simplicity by eliminating three complex,
largely-overlapping provisions and replaces them with a stand-alone
provision that clearly differentiates between those lifetime transfers
subject to estate taxation and those not subject to such taxation. Second,
it eliminates estate taxation when it is least justifiable – namely, when
the transferor relinquishes direct economic benefit from the property and
merely retains a non-beneficial interest to determine who gets what.
Third, it creates an incentive for transferors who retain economic
interests in property to value the retained interests at zero and pay gift
tax on the full fair market value of the entire property. This avoids
residual concern about potential additional deathtime taxation; however,
in so doing, paying transfer tax much sooner than might otherwise be the
case – in essence, obtaining the “quid” of protection against potential
additional estate taxation in exchange for the “quo” of greater gift
taxation.
This approach departs fundamentally from existing law by treating
irrevocable transfers with retained non-beneficial interests as completed
gifts when made. This approach reflects a preference for immediate gift
taxation because the transfer is irrevocable and the donor can calculate
precisely the value of the property. Once Lear irrevocably relinquishes
his interest in property – by irrevocably transferring land in trust for the
benefit of Cordelia or Goneril or Regan in such amounts as he might
later determine but, in all events, to one or more of them at some point –
a rule that imposes a wait-and-see approach for transfer tax purposes
until Lear actually chooses who gets what seems counterintuitive when
the existence and amount of the gift are both known. Current law greatly
exaggerates the subjective value of one’s ability to control another’s
beneficial interest in property and then compounds the problem by
imposing, at least in some circumstances, estate taxation on the full date
of death value of the property to which this power attached.19
18. The suggested change would also require a conforming amendment to Section 2035(a) to
eliminate the references to these three sections to the extent they are no longer applicable. For an
overview of Section 2035 and inclusion within the gross estate of gifts made within three years of
death, see Peter S Cremer, The 1981 Act and Section 2035: Problems and Possibilities, 35 TAX
LAW. 389 (1982), and Jeffrey G. Sherman, Hairsplitting under I.R.C. Section 2035(D): The Cause
and the Cure, 16 VA. TAX REV. 111 (1996).
19. Early taxation should not impose any undue hardship on taxpayers because individuals,
confronted with the impediment of immediate gift taxation, can always structure their giving
differently by making periodic gifts directly to beneficiaries rather than lump-sum transfers in trust.
Early taxation should not shortchange the public fiscally either. The government will receive tax
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This Article consists of two main parts. Part II reviews the history
and scope of Sections 2036, 2037 and 2038 of the Internal Revenue
Code. This part shows that these provisions are not an integrated whole
but rather seriatim responses to judicial decisions about estate taxation
with which Congress disagreed. This part contends that Congress’
hurried efforts to respond to perceived judicial mistakes resulted in
statutory provisions that are difficult to understand and even more
difficult to apply. Part III proposes an alternative approach to transfer
taxation of retained interests and powers of the type covered by Sections
2036, 2037 and 2038. This part advocates repeal of these provisions and
replacement with a stand-alone provision that preserves estate taxation
when the transferor retains a financial interest in the property, but values
her interest at an amount other than zero for gift tax purposes, except
when her interest involves payment of specific amounts, at specific
times, or the use of a personal residence. In addition, this part includes
suggested text for such a statutory provision, provides commentary
regarding various aspects of the suggested provision and explains why
this approach is preferable to current law. Lastly, Part IV summarizes
these arguments and briefly concludes.
II. SECTIONS 2036, 2037 AND 2038 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
A.

Overview of Section 2036

Section 2036(a) of the Internal Revenue Code20 traces its origin to
the Revenue Act of 1916,21 which imposed estate taxation on, among
other things, lifetime transfers “in contemplation of or intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after [the transferor’s] death.”22
revenue earlier than might otherwise be the case and thereby obtain a present value advantage that
does not currently exist and an opportunity to invest the increased revenue in ventures of its own
choosing.
20. Section 2036(a) provides: “[t]he value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of an interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer . . . by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for any period not
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his
death – (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or (2) the
right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or
enjoy the property or the income therefrom.” 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a).
21. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756. The entire estate tax comprised
four pages of the statutes at large thus reflecting a simpler (or perhaps more naïve) time. See id. at
777-80. For a general overview of the events leading to the original estate tax, as well as the history
of estate taxation in America, see LEWIS, supra note 11, § 25, at 655-704.
22. Revenue Act of 1916, § 202, 39 Stat. at 777-78. The estate tax expressly applied to
transfers in contemplation of death until 1976, at which time Congress replaced a subjective
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Facially, this statutory language drew within the decedent’s gross estate
lifetime transfers in which the transferor retained the right to use the
transferred property, to receive any income generated by it, or to control
who might obtain these benefits, but in all events passing to someone
else upon the transferor’s death.23 The Supreme Court held otherwise in
May v. Heiner,24 concluding that deathtime taxation was inappropriate
because the transferor’s secondary income interest, which had not yet
attached, expired at death – meaning that there was no interest that
passed at death and thus nothing to tax.25
Eleven months later, Congress responded with unusual alacrity,
expressing by joint resolution that the phrase “intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after” the transferor’s death included “a
transfer under which the transferor has retained for his life or for any
period not ending before his death (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or
the income from, the property or (2) the right to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom . . .”26
Congress modified this language several years later, dropping the “in

standard based on the decedent’s motive with an objective standard that focused on the time
between transfer and death – with the gross estate including transfers occurring within three years of
death. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 11, ¶ 1.02[2][b], at 1-4. Congress revised this standard in
1981 by making it applicable only to property that would have been included within the gross estate
under Sections 2036, 2037, 2038, or 2042 in the absence of a transfer within three years of death.
See 26 U.S.C. § 2035(a).
23. This provision was critical to the success of the initial estate tax because, at the time, there
was not any gift tax and individuals could avoid deathtime taxation altogether by making lifetime
gifts. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 116-17 (1931) (“The dominant purpose [of the
provision] is to reach substitutes for testamentary disposition and thus to prevent the evasion of the
estate tax.”). Congress did not establish a gift tax until 1924 (approximately eight years after
establishing the estate tax) and then promptly repealed it in 1926 in favor of an additional provision
in the estate tax that conclusively presumed transfers made within two years of death were made in
contemplation of death and thus subject to estate taxation. In 1932, the Supreme Court held
conclusive presumptions unconstitutional as applied in this context, and Congress responded by
enacting a gift tax later that year. See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Revenue Act of 1932,
Pub. L. 72-154, tit. 3, 47 Stat. 169, 245-59.
24. May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930) (trust instrument provided for payment of income to
transferor’s husband for transferor’s life and, should he predecease her, then to her, but in all events,
upon her death to her children). “At the death of Mrs. May no interest in the property held under the
trust deed passed from her to the living . . . . The interest therein which she possessed immediately
prior to her death was obliterated by that event.” Id. at 243.
25. Id. The Supreme Court reasoned that the primary income interest (in favor of the
transferor’s husband) continued in effect even after the transferor’s death and that upon his death the
remainder interest (in favor of the transferor’s children) would pass to them. As such, there was not
any “transfer” of property at the transferor-decedent’s death because all such “transfers” either
occurred previously or would not occur until later. Id. at 243-45.
26. Joint Resolution to Amend Section 302 of the Revenue Act of 1926, H.R.J. Res.529, 71st
Cong., 46 Stat. 1516, 1516-17 (1931).
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contemplation of death” requirement and fashioning the language into its
present form.27
Section 2036(a)(1), as presently written, draws into the gross estate
property transferred during life in which the transferor retained a
beneficial interest in the property – specifically, the right to use or enjoy
the property or the right to receive the income generated by it.28 Section
2036(a)(2), in turn, extends inclusion to those transfers in which the
transferor retained control over others’ interests in the property –
namely, the power to decide, from time to time, who will have the right
to use or possess the property or the income from it.29 Significantly,
Section 2036(a)(2) requires inclusion even when the transferor did not
retain any direct beneficial interest in the property, meaning that she did
not benefit financially following the transfer but merely controlled who
would.30 Section 2036(b), which Congress added many years later in
response to another Supreme Court decision,31 explains that retaining the
right to vote the stock of a controlled corporation falls within the
statutory definition of the term “retention or enjoyment of transferred
property.”32 The ostensible rationale for this later addition is that voting
27. Revenue Act of 1932, § 803(a), 47 Stat. at 279.
28. A frequently used example regarding the scope and application of Section 2036(a)(1)
involves an irrevocable transfer of property in trust with income to the transferor for life and the
remainder passing to her best friend upon death. The initial transfer is subject to gift tax on the
present value of the remainder interest because the decedent relinquished dominion and control as to
this interest. Section 2036(a)(1) separately and additionally requires inclusion of the same property
in the decedent’s gross estate for estate tax purposes, and additional tax will be imposed as may be
appropriate. 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a)(1) (2012).
29. Id. § 2036(a)(2) (“[t]he value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to
the extent of an interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer . . . by trust or
otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without
reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death . . . (2) the right,
either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy
the property or the income therefrom.”).
30. A frequently used example regarding the scope and application of Section 2036(a)(2)
involves an irrevocable transfer of property in trust with income payable to a golf or tennis
instructor for ten years, as the transferor may choose in her absolute discretion, with the remainder
payable at the end of the term to her best friend. The methodology for calculating the amount of the
gift for gift tax purposes is simpler, because the present values of the gifts will equal the fair market
value of the property. Section 2036(a) requires inclusion of this same property in the decedent’s
estate for estate tax purposes, and an additional estate tax will be imposed to the extent that the
property appreciated in value between the date of the transfer in trust and the date of death. Id.
31. See generally United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972) (irrevocable transfer of stock
of controlled corporation to trust was not includable in the decedent’s gross estate even though he
reserved right to vote stock and veto sale or other disposition).
32. Section 2036(b)(1) provides that “the retention of the right to vote (directly or indirectly)
shares of stock of a controlled corporation shall be considered to be a retention of the enjoyment of
transferred property.” 26 U.S.C. § 2036(b)(1). Section 2036(b)(2) provides, in turn, that “a
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rights are “so significant with respect to corporate stock that the
retention of voting rights by a donor should be treated as the retention of
the enjoyment of the stock for estate tax purposes. Congress believed
that this treatment is necessary to prevent avoidance of estate taxes.”33
Section 2036(a) can have a dramatic impact on the value of the
gross estate in those situations to which it applies. In particular, Section
2036(a) pulls into the gross estate the value of the entire property to
which the interest attaches (and not simply the value of the interest
itself).34 For example, a seventy-year-old who transfers $1 million of
IBM stock to a trust, retaining the right to receive dividend income for
life and providing that the remainder will pass to her best friend upon
death, will have the entire $1 million of stock included in her estate
(assuming market values have not changed during the interim). The
same result occurs when the seventy-year-old makes the same transfer,
to the same trust, providing for the same remainder interest to her best
friend but instead provides that dividend income is payable to the
seventy-year-old’s neighbor in such amounts as the transferor sees fit to
allocate to the neighbor. Section 2036(a) does not differentiate between
beneficial and non-beneficial interests and thus draws into the gross
estate the value of the property to which either type of interest attaches.35
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the property is valued for
estate tax purposes at its date of death value rather than its value at the
time of initial transfer in trust.36 A transferor who transfers IBM stock
valued at $1 million to a trust on January 1, 1980, retaining the right to
receive dividend income for life but providing that the stock pass to her
corporation shall be treated as a controlled corporation if, at any time after the transfer of the
property and during the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent’s death, the decedent
owned (with the application of Section 318), or had the right (either alone or in conjunction with
any person) to vote, stock possessing at least 20 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock.” Id. § 2036(b)(2). The reference to Section 318 of the Internal Revenue Code
brings within the reach of stock ownership of a corporation, for purposes of Section 2036, any stock
owned in the same corporation by certain family members, partnerships, and other controlled
corporations. 26 U.S.C. § 318(a).
33. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., REP. ON TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 589
(Comm. Print 1976). The amendment reflects a response to (and rejection of) the Byrum decision.
See id. at 588-89.
34. See Estate of D’Ambrosio v. Comm’r, 101 F.3d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Section 2036(a)
effectively discourages manipulative transfers of remainder interests which are really testamentary
in character by ‘pulling back’ the full, fee simple value of the transferred property into the gross
estate . . . .”).
35. See 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a).
36. Id. § 2031(a) (emphasis added) (“The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be
determined by including to the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of his death of
all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated.”).
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best friend at death, will have stock valued at $11.6 million included in
her gross estate were she to die on January 1, 2014, due to the stock’s
appreciation in value during the interim.37 (The outcome is different,
however, when the interest attaches to only a portion of the property, in
which event only that portion of the transferred property is included in
the estate.38 Thus, a retained interest in one-half of the dividend income
from the IBM stock would halve the resulting inclusion at death.)
Section 2036(a) is typically justified on the ground that transfers
subject to retained interests or powers possess the “look and feel” of
testamentary dispositions (indeed, they are frequently characterized as
“quasi-testamentary” transfers) because the transferor’s relationship to
the property is not materially different the day after the transfer than it
was the day before.39 Two leading commentators explain: because
“persons of substantial wealth often live on their income and have little
need to invade capital, a reserved life estate may preserve the most
important aspect of ownership, and a gift of the remainder interest may
merely anticipate a disposition that would otherwise have occurred at the
decedent’s death.”40 They continue, however, explaining that the same
37. The stock prices identified in this example are split adjusted prices at January 1, 1980, and
at January 1, 2014. IBM stock prices are available at Historical Stock Price Lookup, IBM,
http://www.ibm.com/investor/financials/historical-stock-price-lookup.wss (last visited Mar. 29,
2015). Of course, markets do not always rise and sometimes fall precipitously, in which event the
lower date of death valuation would be used for purposes of inclusion under Section 2036.
38. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 2011) (“If the decedent retained or
reserved an interest or right with respect to a part only of the property transferred by him, the
amount to be included in his gross estate under section 2036 is only a corresponding proportion of
the amount described in the preceding sentence [i.e., the value of the entire property].”).
39. See Estate of Stewart v. Comm’r, 617 F.3d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Absent § 2036 a
decedent could transfer to her heir the remainder in a property while retaining a life estate, and the
economic result would be substantially identical to what would have occurred if the decedent had
left the property to the heir in her will under an irrevocable contract so to do.”); Estate of Abraham
v. Comm’r, 408 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316,
320 (1969)) (“Section 2036 is designed to capture in the decedent’s gross estate ‘transfers that are
essentially testamentary – i.e., transfers which leave the transferor a significant interest in or control
over the property transferred during his lifetime.’”); Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r, 382 F.3d 367,
375 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Section 2036 addresses the concern that inter vivos transfers often function as
will substitutes, with the transferor continuing to enjoy the benefits of his property during life, and
the beneficiary receiving the property only upon the transferor’s death.”); Mahoney v. United
States, 831 F.2d 641, 647 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 112 (1940))
(“[T]he statute operates to tax transfers of property ‘that are too much akin to testamentary
dispositions not to be subjected to the same excise.’”); Wheeler v. United States, No. SA-94-CA964, 1996 WL 266420, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 26 1996), rev’d, 116 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 1997)
(“Transfers which leave the transferor a significant interest in or control over the property during his
lifetime are essentially testamentary in nature, requiring inclusion of the transferred property in the
estate.”).
40. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 3, ¶ 126.6, at 126-71.
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justification extends to retained powers as well:
In arguing that these transfers perpetuate the substance of ownership
for the donor and give the donee only the promise of future enjoyment,
tax theorists have usually focused on transfers under which the donor
is entitled to get the income personally, but the same rationale can be
extended to non-beneficial powers, such as a right to spray the income
among persons to be designated by the donor. Even though the donor
cannot derive direct economic benefit from a power of this type, the
very fact that the transfer was made suggests that the donor has no personal need for the income, and that the power to decide, from time to
time, which of the beneficiaries shall get the superfluous income is one
41
of the most pleasurable aspects of “ownership.”

These commentators thus emphasize the transferor’s continued status in
relation to the property, rather than her technical legal status, for
purposes of justifying later taxation at death: The transferor may transfer
legal title to a trustee, and she may divest herself of “ownership” of the
property from the perspective of state law, but (from the outside looking
in) her relationship to the property has not meaningfully changed – she
continues to receive income from the property, or live on the property, or
direct its distribution to others.
Other commentators question the propriety of this rationale when
applied to non-beneficial interests (such as the right to determine “who
gets what”). They contend that this explanation represents an antiquated
vestige of an earlier time when lifetime transfers with retained interests
were challenged in probate court on the ground that they were, in fact,
testamentary in nature and, as such, lacked the formal requirements
under state law for valid deathtime transfers. These commentators
explain:
The explanation that the transfers are testamentary in nature is a reflection of a time when disappointed heirs challenged the validity of certain lifetime transfers on the basis that they ought to be subject to the
formalities required for a valid will. [Section 2036 seems] to echo that
general sense – that the estate tax should apply to assets that the decedent had retained enjoyment of or control over during life. State law
has come a long way toward assuring the validity of lifetime transfers,
regardless of their testamentary appearance. This widespread recognition under state laws would seem to weaken the criterion of testamen41. Id. at 126-72; see also Dodge, supra note 1, at 314 (“It will also be objected that a
retained power to alter beneficial interests is not as ‘valuable’ as a retained interest. The answer to
that, to a person of great wealth who is materially well off, a retained power is likely to be as
valuable as a retained interest. If the power were not important, it would not have been retained.”).
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42

The justifications for estate taxation of lifetime transfers with
retained interests and powers may (or may not) have continuing validity,
but they become moot when changes in other areas of transfer taxation
provide tools that can be deployed to clear a path toward tax simplicity.43
Moreover, and perhaps just as importantly, transfer taxation based on the
assumed (and presumed) subjective value of the ability to decide “who
gets what” lacks intellectual probity in the absence of some objective
measure of the actual value to individual transferors.44
B.

Overview of Section 2037

Section 2037 of the Internal Revenue Code45 traces its origins to the
Technical Changes Act of 1949.46 This statutory provision reflects
Congress’ response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Spiegel’s Estate
v. Commissioner, which again construed the phrase “intended to take
effect . . . at death” differently from the way Congress would have
preferred.47 In contrast to the unduly narrow construction given this
phrase in May v. Heiner,48 the Supreme Court switched gears and – at
42. ABA Task Force on Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, supra note 14, at 227.
43. The principles behind Section 2702 – enacted in 1990 to combat certain estate freeze
techniques – can be applied broadly to all forms of retained interests and powers for purposes of
creating “rough justice” transfer taxation that taxes irrevocable lifetime transfers once (but only
once) under the gift tax (but not the estate tax). See 26 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012). This approach
concedes additional deathtime taxation on any appreciation in value between transfer and death in
exchange for increased, immediate life-time taxation – a concession that may (or may not) be all
that great given that the government necessarily benefits on a present value basis due to immediate
taxation and the opportunity to invest greater tax revenues in ventures of its own choosing, while the
transferor potentially benefits only when the transferred asset appreciates in real terms. See infra
text accompanying notes 77-83.
44. In fact, aggregate transfer tax increases, assuming a single transfer rather than multiple
transfers, insofar as a transferor who makes a lump sum transfer rather than multiple smaller
transfers, may limit her ability to claim the annual gift tax exclusion, which is maximized by
spreading gifts to a particular donee over a number of years rather than concentrating them in a
single year. See 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b) (“In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future interest in
property) made to any person by the donor during the calendar year, the first [$12,000] of such gifts
to such person shall not . . . be included in the total amount of gifts made during such year.”).
45. Id. § 2037(a) (“the value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time . . . made a transfer . . . , by trust
or otherwise, if (1) possession or enjoyment of the property can, through ownership of such interest,
be obtained only by surviving the decedent and (2) the decedent has retained a reversionary interest
in the property . . . , and the value of such reversionary interest immediately before the death of the
decedent exceeds 5 percent of the value of such property.”).
46. Technical Changes Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-378, § 7, 63 Stat. 891, 894-896.
47. Spiegel’s Estate v. Comm’r, 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
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least from Congress’ perspective – gave the phrase an overly broad
construction when it held that inclusion was required even though the
transferor possessed a de minimis reversionary interest by operation of
state law and not by express reservation in the trust instrument.49 The
estate tax consequence was significant – the reversionary interest
possessed an actuarial value of $4,000 (or less than one-half of one
percent of the trust corpus) yet caused a net increase in estate tax of
more than $450,000.50
Congress responded even more swiftly than it did to May v. Heiner,
amending the statute nine months later to provide for estate taxation of
reversionary interests but, with respect to pre-enactment transfers (such
as the one involved in Spiegel’s Estate), only when the interest was
expressly retained in the trust instrument and, even then, only when the
value of the reversionary interest immediately before the transferor’s
death exceeded five percent of the value of the trust property.51 The
statute thus reversed the outcome in Spiegel’s Estate.
Congress took an altogether different tack with respect to postenactment transfers, however, and imposed inclusion without regard to
whether the transferor expressly retained a reversionary interest in the
trust property. This is so as long as someone other than the transferor
could obtain possession or enjoyment by surviving the transferor or,
alternatively, by surviving some specified event and the specified event
did not occur during the decedent’s lifetime.52 Congress melded these
competing provisions five years later and established a uniform standard
for inclusion of property transfers taking effect at death.53
49. The trust instrument provided the trust income should be divided among the transferor’s
three children during his life but, if they predeceased him, then to any of their surviving children.
Spiegel’s Estate, 335 U.S. at 703. The trust instrument also provided that the corpus should be
distributed in the same manner at the transferor’s death. Id. The trust instrument did not provide for
the distribution of the corpus in the event the transferor survived his children and grandchildren. Id.
The failure to provide expressly for this contingency gave rise to a right of reversion under state law
and thus estate taxation under federal law. Id.
50. Id. at 727 (Burton, J., dissenting).
51. Technical Changes Act of 1949, § 7(a), 63 Stat. at 895.
52. Id.
53. One commentator explains that the statute “does not restrict the term ‘reversionary
interest’ to its common law meaning. The term includes any possibility that property might return to
the decedent or his estate and any possibility that the property might become subject to a power of
disposition by him.” LEWIS, supra note 11, § 7.5.2, at 160; see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note
11, ¶ 4.09[4][a], at 4-244 (“[T]his requirement is satisfied by the existence of the possibility; it is
not necessary to show the property will return. Even if the possibility ends with the decedent’s
death, he has retained the requisite interest long enough within the statutory concept.”). Section
2037(b) thus provides in pertinent part: “[t]he term ‘reversionary interest’ includes a possibility that
property transferred by the decedent – (1) may return to him or his estate, or (2) may be subject to a
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Section 2037, as currently written, requires inclusion only when the
value of the reversionary interest immediately before the transferor’s
death exceeds five percent of the value of the transferred property.54 The
reversionary interest is valued for this purpose by taking into
consideration (a) the mathematical chance – based on age – that the
transferor will survive the contingency upon which the reversionary
interest rests; (b) the fact that the transferor’s interest cannot take effect
in any event until the contingency is fulfilled; and (c) the value of the
transferred property.55 For example, a sixty-year-old irrevocably
transfers IBM stock valued at $1 million to a trust. The trust instrument
requires payment of dividend income for life to the transferor’s golf
instructor, who is twenty-five years old, and then, upon the golf
instructor’s passing, the stock returns to the transferor if she is living
but, if she is not, then to her tennis instructor. The transferor dies four
years later. The value of the reversionary interest will be established as
of the date of death by first determining the statistical likelihood that the
transferor (now age sixty-four) will survive the golf instructor (now age
twenty-nine), and then multiplying the resulting percentage by the
discounted present value of the stock immediately before death (because
the transferor cannot obtain the property until the golf instructor reaches
her actuarial death age, hence the need to calculate a present value). The
value of the reversionary interest on these extreme facts is probably well
below five percent, but it illustrates the purpose of the threshold: to
exempt from estate taxation property with very little chance of finding
its way back to the transferor and thus, as two commentators colorfully
explain, “put an end to a saturnalia of litigation involving alleged or
actual reversionary interests of monumental trivia.”56
Once this threshold requirement is satisfied, the amount included in
the gross estate is the value of the interests that are dependent upon
surviving the transferor – or, put differently, the value of the property
less the value of those interests that are not dependent upon surviving the
transferor.57 Altering the facts slightly, in which the value of the
power of disposition by him, but such term does not include a possibility that income alone from
such property may return to him or become subject to a power of disposition by him.” 26 U.S.C. §
2037(b) (2012). The breadth of this language is sufficient to justify inclusion, for example, when the
putative survivor contracts to bequeath the transferred property back to the original transferor. See
Estate of Gilbert v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 349 (1950).
54. 26 U.S.C. § 2037(a)(2).
55. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-7(d)(2)(ii) (2014).
56. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 3, ¶ 126.7.4, at 126-109.
57. Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(b) (1958) (“[T]he value of an interest in transferred property is
not included in a decedent’s gross estate . . . unless possession or enjoyment of the property

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

15

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 1

470

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:455

reversionary interest exceeds five percent of the value of the trust
property, the amount that would be included in the gross estate would be
the value of the IBM stock discounted to present value to reflect the time
that the tennis instructor will be expected to wait to obtain possession of
the property based on the golf instructor’s actuarial death age.
As one might expect, Section 2037 is a moribund provision within
the estate tax. A Westlaw search for cases involving Section 2037 since
1949 generated only twenty-one “hits,” and of these, only twelve
involved any substantive treatment of it.58 Consistent with this, two
commentators explain that Section 2037 “has probably functioned
primarily as a trap for the unwary because the reversionary interests that
bring it into force are usually retained more by mistake than by
design.”59 The lack of significance may be a function of its origin: as a
hastily-drawn response to an improvident judicial decision, Section 2037
provided little more than immediate relief to the losing party in a single
case. Its presence in the estate tax is thus more a matter of historical
accident than principled draftsmanship.
The status of Section 2037 as a separate provision, rather than part
of Section 2036, is difficult to justify. To be sure, the two sections focus
on different retained interests: the former involves future contingent
interests while the latter involves present possessory interests.60 They
also impact estate valuation differently: the former draws into the gross
estate the value of the individual interest that is contingent on surviving
the transferor while the latter draws in the value of the entire property to
which the interest attaches.61 These differences – however important
they may be from a substantive or economic perspective – are relatively
modest from the perspective of drafting technique. Indeed, one cannot
imagine a legislator, who is drafting on a clean slate, concluding that the
statute dealing with the beneficial interests covered by these two sections
should do so separately rather than uniformly. To the contrary, one
would expect the legislator to recognize the similarity between the
retained interests covered and meld and harmonize them into a single
provision.
could . . . have been obtained . . . by any beneficiary either by surviving the decedent or through the
occurrence of some other event such as the expiration of a term of years.”).
58. The terms and connectors search that generated these results was “(26 /5 2037!) & ‘estate
tax’”; the database was “all federal courts.” The “hits” determination involved mere verification that
the statutory provision was cited in a case; the “substantive application” determination required
some indication that the court relied upon the provision in resolving at least one issue in the case.
59. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 3, ¶ 126.7.1, at 126-104.
60. 26 U.S.C. §§ 2036-2037 (2012).
61. Id.
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Nor would one expect a threshold valuation requirement in one but
not the other. The two sections apply to retained interests that the
transferor expressly included in the trust instrument. As such, it is
difficult to understand why one of the transferors would receive
differential (and preferential) treatment for purposes of estate valuation
on the apparent assumption that retained reversionary interests of modest
value should not result in dramatic economic consequences to the estate
when retained powers can result in such consequences. The two cannot
be harmonized on this point in any meaningful fashion – both should
have the same valuation threshold or neither should have any threshold.
These provisions may or may not have continued utility, either in whole
or in part, but at a minimum those portions that are retained should be
included in a single statutory provision.
C.

Overview of Section 2038

Section 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code62 traces its origin to
Section 202(d) of the Revenue Act of 1924.63 This provision drew into
the gross estate property transferred by the decedent under
circumstances in which the transferee’s “enjoyment thereof was subject
at the date of [the decedent’s] death to any change through the exercise
of a power, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to alter,
amend or revoke, or where decedent relinquished any such power in
contemplation of his death.”64 Congress later amended this statutory
language in response to White v. Poor in which the Supreme Court held
that a power to alter, amend, modify or revoke must be retained
expressly by the transferor and not conferred upon her by another.65 The
Court also raised, but did not decide, whether a power to “terminate” a
62. Id. § 2038(a)(1) (“The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property . . .
[t]o the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer . . . by
trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change
through the exercise of a power (in whatever capacity exercisable) by the decedent alone or by the
decedent in conjunction with any other person (without regard to when or from what source the
decedent acquired such power), to alter, amend, revoke or terminate, or where any such power is
relinquished during the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent’s death.”).
63. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. 68-176, § 202(d), 43 Stat. 253, 304. Section 202(d)
provided in full: “To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer, or with respect to which he has at any time created a trust, where the enjoyment thereof
was subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power, either by the
decedent alone or in conjunction with any person, to alter, amend, or revoke, or where the decedent
relinquished any such power in contemplation of his death, except in case of a bona fide sale for a
fair consideration in money or money’s worth.” Id.
64. Id.
65. White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98 (1935).
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trust was among the powers to which the statute applied.66 Congress
promptly added an express reference to the power to “terminate” a trust
and also added language making clear that inclusion was necessary when
the transferor transferred property and later acquired from another a
power to alter, amend, modify, revoke or terminate.67
Section 2038, like Section 2036, is based on the notion that a power
to control another’s interest in property is a significant attribute of
ownership and should therefore be taxed as such at death. The Senate
Finance Committee explained:
If the decedent had the power at the time of his death to change the enjoyment of a property interest, which he had transferred, or with respect to which he had created a trust, such interest is to be included for
estate tax purposes in his gross estate. . . . Even though the decedent
has made the transfers specified in this subdivision, he has retained
substantial control over the disposition of the property through the
power to change the enjoyment thereof. Such property interests should
therefore fairly be taxed as part of the decedent’s estate, particularly
since, by virtue of his death, the substantial interest which he had has
been wiped out, and to the same extent the property interest of the legal title holder, his transferee, has been increased. This provision is in
accord with the principle which taxes to the grantor the income of a
68
revocable trust.

Given the similarity of purpose, it is not surprising that Section 2038 and
Section 2036 overlap to a great extent.
The similarities (and differences) between the two can be subtle.
On the one hand, both apply to powers or controls over other people’s
beneficial interests; they apply to powers and controls that exist at death
without regard to whether any were exercised during life; and they
require inclusion even when the power cannot be exercised unilaterally
but only in conjunction with another. On the other hand, Section 2038
applies exclusively to reserved powers over remainder interests (such as
the power to change the identities or relative shares of remaindermen),69
66. Id. at 101.
67. Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740, § 805(a), 49 Stat. 1648, 1744-45.
68. S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 34-35 (1924).
69. See Estate of Bowgren v. Comm’r, 105 F.3d 1156, 1160 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Section
2038(a)(1) requires inclusion of the value of the property transferred in trust in the settlor’s gross
estate if, at the time of his death, the settlor retains the discretionary power to terminate the trust.
The settlor’s power to terminate the beneficiaries’ rights to enjoyment of the trust is a power to
‘alter, amend, revoke or terminate’ for purposes of I.R.C. § 2038(a)(1).”); Kisling v. Comm’r, 32
F.3d 1222, 1225 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Under Section 2038, transfers made during the life of the
decedent are includable in the gross estate if enjoyment of the transferred property is limited or
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while Section 2036 applies exclusively to retained powers over present
interests measured in relation to the transferor’s life (such as the retained
power, for life, to change the identities or relative shares of those who
may use or enjoy trust property).70
The subtle differences between these provisions are especially
manifest with respect to the amounts drawn into the gross estate when
both are applicable. Section 2036 draws into the gross estate the value of
the property to which the interest attaches71 (typically, the entirety of the
property unless the interest attaches to a smaller portion of the property),
while Section 2038 draws into the gross estate the value of the interest
that is subject to alteration, amendment, modification, revocation or
termination.72 This seemingly modest difference can have enormous
financial consequences. For example, suppose transferor transfers $1
million of IBM stock to a trust. The trust instrument provides that
dividend income will be paid to transferor’s golf instructor for the
duration of transferor’s life; that the stock will pass to transferor’s tennis
instructor upon transferor’s death; and that transferor retains the right to
name additional or different beneficiaries with respect to dividend
income. Section 2036(a)(2) and Section 2038 apply to the transfer but
they diverge quite dramatically on the transferor’s death because the
former causes inclusion of the date of death value of the entire property
(because the decedent’s power attached to the entirety of the property)
while the latter does not cause any inclusion (because the interest to
which the power attached, the golf instructor’s income interest,
extinguished along with the transferor’s life).
The outcome flips when the facts change only slightly. Transferor
again transfers $1 million of IBM stock to a trust. The trust instrument
again provides that dividend income will be paid to transferor’s golf
instructor for the duration of transferor’s life; that the stock will pass to
transferor’s tennis instructor upon transferor’s death; and that transferor
reserves the right to name additional or different remaindermen. In this
changed scenario in which the reserved power attaches to the remainder
interest rather than a present interest, Section 2036(a)(2) does not apply
subject to change, because the decedent retained power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the
transfer or relinquished that power within three years of her death - even if the decedent does not
exercise those powers.”).
70. Section 2038 also applies in the unique situation in which the transferor divests herself of
every power or control over the property but then reacquires one of these powers through some
twist of fate (such as an appointment to serve as trustee). As noted above, Congress specifically
intended inclusion in this circumstance, however rare it may be.
71. 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a) (2012).
72. Id. § 2038(a).
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(because it concerns retained powers over present possessory interests
alone), while Section 2038 draws into the gross estate the entire property
(because the transferor-decedent held a power at death that could affect
the remainder interest, which at death is valued at the property’s entire
value).73
The justification for two provisions that apply to retained powers
appears to be lost in history. The legislative record is unclear, and one is
hard-pressed to discern why a rational legislator would proceed in this
fashion. One possibility is that adding new provisions, to confront new
situations as they arise, is easier than continuing to reflect upon existing
law and then modifying that law in relation to the new and unanticipated
exigencies. Another possibility is that new and additional provisions,
while leaving existing provisions intact, provide better protection against
evasive tax strategies than reworking existing law which, in so doing,
might unwittingly open other avenues for avoidance. A third possibility
is that repeated overhauls of existing law creates uncertainty about
existing estate planning strategies and that this will be unnecessarily
expensive as those earlier strategies must be evaluated for continued
compliance.
Nonetheless, the combination of overlap between Sections 2036
and 2037 on the one hand, as well as the overlap between Sections 2036
and 2038 on the other, strongly suggests that legislative reform should
be pursued to provide a single set of governing rules applicable to
lifetime transfers with retained interests and controls that can be easily
understood and readily applied and, just as importantly, make sense in
relation to one another. The policy of protecting expectations is uniquely
important in this area given that individuals must frequently make
choices about lifetime and deathtime giving long before the event that
precipitates the gift. This might suggest that some amount of untidiness
in drafting technique or organizational form must be accepted because
change (even positive change for purposes of good order) is preferable
to imposing substantial costs on taxpayers who must then confirm that
their prior decisions about giving remain valid and not subject to
73. This situation is more complicated when the duration of the trust is measured by a term of
years or by the life of someone other than the transferor. For example, transferor transfers $1
million of IBM stock in trust. The trust instrument provides that dividend income is payable to her
golf instructor for the duration of her husband’s life, with the stock passing upon husband’s death to
transferor’s tennis instructor. Transferor retains the ability to name new or additional dividend
income beneficiaries. In this changed scenario, Section 2036 applies and draws into the gross estate
the value of the entire property (because this is the value of the property to which the interest
attached); Section 2038 also applies and draws into the gross estate the value of the income interest
alone (because this is the interest that is subject to the retained interest).
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differing tax outcomes.
Any reform effort must therefore be sensitive to existing
expectations and draft with an eye toward retaining those portions of the
statutory scheme that work well while simultaneously jettisoning those
that are unnecessary and redundant. The present environment presents
such an opportunity to evaluate the continued need for three separate
provisions that, to varying degrees, address the same problems as the
other two: the gift tax and estate tax are largely unified,74 the same rate
structure applies to transfers during life and at death, and the tax
ultimately applies to cumulative transfers whether made during life or at
death. The time is therefore ripe for reform.
III. A SIMPLE RULE FOR TAXATION OF RETAINED INTERESTS
Sections 2036, 2037 and 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code are
“quick fixes” to perceived mistakes by the judiciary when construing
and applying the original estate tax.75 It is not surprising, therefore, that
the resulting statutory language – drawn and re-drawn in response to the
judicial decision du jour76 – does not constitute an integrated whole. To
ameliorate this situation, and to provide sensible, easy to follow rules,
the statutory reform recommended in this Article retains the best of these
provisions while jettisoning those portions that are duplicative or
unnecessary. Section A introduces the proposed statutory reform and
identifies the policy justifications upon which the proposal rests. Section
B next discusses the scope of property included in the gross estate under
the proposed statutory reform. Section C then identifies three exceptions
from inclusion in the gross estate: (1) qualified interests; (2) qualified
personal residence trusts; and (3) optional valuation for gift tax
purposes.

74. The estate and gift taxes are not fully “integrated,” and lifetime transfers have some
advantages over deathtime transfers. For example, an individual can gift $14,000 to as many
different people as she wants without incurring any gift tax on any or all of the transfers. 26 U.S.C.
§ 2503(b)(1). Moreover, lifetime giving is taxed on a tax exclusive basis, whereas deathtime giving
is taxed on a tax inclusive basis – meaning that the gift tax is calculated solely in reference to the
gift itself, whereas the estate tax is calculated on the gift plus the amount necessary to pay the tax on
the gift. Assume taxpayer has $1.5 million to give away, either during life or at death, in an
environment in which gift and estate taxation is at a flat 50% rate. If taxpayer makes a lifetime gift,
she can give $1 million and use the remaining $500,000 to pay gift tax. If, in contrast, taxpayer
makes a deathtime gift, she can only give $750,000 because she will need the same amount to pay
estate tax.
75. See supra Part II.
76. May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930); Spiegel’s Estate v. Comm’r, 335 U.S. 701 (1949);
White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98 (1935).
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Suggested Statutory Reform

The statutory reform recommended in this Article rests on two
assumptions. First, estate taxation of retained interests is justified when
the transferor retains a beneficial interest in the transferred property –
namely, one that puts money in her pocket directly (such as the right to
receive income from trust property) or indirectly (such as the right to use
the trust property). In this circumstance, the imposition of estate taxation
seems fair and reasonable. Second, estate taxation of retained controls is
not justified when the transferor-decedent retains control over others’
beneficial interests in trust property but washes her hands of the ability
to reclaim the property for her own use or possession. The retention of
the ability to choose who gets what may appear to some as “one of the
most pleasurable aspects of ownership” (a proposition that is not selfevident), but it does not follow that estate taxation is justified.77 In this
circumstance, the imposition of estate taxation seems unfair and
unreasonable because there is no relationship (whether logical or
otherwise) between the value of the property drawn into the gross estate
– in some instances the full fair market value of the entire property – and
the actual subjective value of the power to the transferor-decedent.78
Consistent with these assumptions, this Article recommends
replacing Sections 2036, 2037 and 2038 with a stand-alone provision
that melds Section 2036(a)(1) and Section 2037(a) and imposes transfer
tax obligations at the time of the transfer and/or at the time of death
depending upon (a) the nature of the retained beneficial interest and (b)
the base against which gift tax was imposed at the time of the initial
transfer. In particular, a transferor who retains a “qualified interest” or
who transfers a personal residence in trust would pay gift tax on the
remainder interest using traditional valuation principles based on the
actuarial tables contained in the Treasury Regulations.79 A transferor
who proceeds in this fashion would insulate her estate from potential
additional estate taxation at death. In addition, a transferor who retains
77. The rationale may be that additional taxation at death is justified because subsequent
appreciation in value provided the transferor with the ability to direct the distribution of a larger
amount of property. But, if true, then one could credibly argue that the transferor should receive a
deathtime refund of some portion of the previously paid gift tax because there was less for her to
spread around due to a subsequent decline in value.
78. A change along these lines would not require any additional statutory language and could
be implemented simply by adding an additional paragraph in the existing gift tax regulations
making clear that a completed gift exists when the transferor irrevocably transfers property in trust,
even though she retains a power or control over subsequent distributions to others, so long as she
fully and finally disclaims any actual or potential economic benefit from the property.
79. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (as amended in 2011).
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any other beneficial interest (other than a reversionary interest) would be
permitted to insulate her estate from additional taxation following death
by paying gift tax at the time of the transfer on the full fair market value
of the transferred property. A transferor who proceeds in either of these
fashions would pay gift tax but not estate tax. Conversely, a transferor
who does not proceed in either of these fashions would remain subject to
the possibility of additional estate taxation upon death, and by extension,
a transferor who retains a reversionary interest of any kind that is then
followed by a possessory interest in favor of another would be ineligible
for this sort of estate tax “insurance” and would pay transfer tax at the
time of the initial transfer and then again at the time of death.
The suggested text for a statutory provision that would accomplish
these goals is as follows:
(a) The value of the gross estate shall include the value of any property
irrevocably transferred by the decedent prior to death, whether by trust
or otherwise, in which the decedent retained an interest for her life, or
for any period not ascertainable without reference to her death, or for
any period that does not in fact end before the decedent’s death, that
(1) allows her to use or possess the transferred property or (2) allows
her to receive the income from the transferred property. This section
shall not apply to any retained interest that satisfies the definition of a
“qualified interest” in Section 2702(b), to any retained interest in a
“personal residence” of the type described in Section 2702(a)(3)(A)(ii),
or to any retained interest that is valued at zero for purposes of determining the amount of tax payable under Chapter 12 of this subtitle.
(b) The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, in which (1) possession or
enjoyment of the property can, through ownership of such interest, be
obtained only by surviving the decedent and (2) the decedent expressly
retained a reversionary interest in the property. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, an interest so transferred shall not be included in the decedent’s gross estate under this section if possession or enjoyment of the
property could have been obtained by any beneficiary during the decedent’s life through the exercise of a general power of appointment (as
defined in Section 2041) which in fact was exercisable immediately
before the decedent’s death.

This suggested text resembles Sections 2036(a)(1) and 2037(a) (and, in
fact, retains the entirety of Section 2037(a) except for the limitation on
inclusion for modestly-sized reversionary interests), but there are several
differences from the existing statutory text that do not fall under the
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rubric of “word-smithing” and therefore require explanation.80
B.

Scope of Potential Inclusion for Estate Taxation

The suggested text draws within the gross estate the date of death
value81 of property irrevocably transferred in trust under circumstances
in which the transferor retained a beneficial interest in the property. The
suggested text thus operates like the current version of Section
2036(a)(1).82 If a retained beneficial interest attaches to the property,
then the entire date of death value of the property is drawn back into the
gross estate for estate tax purposes.83
The suggested text also retains Section 2037(a) in its current form
but eliminates the threshold valuation requirement for retained
reversionary interests.84 The suggested text eliminates this threshold
valuation requirement for two reasons. First, this threshold valuation
requirement cannot be squared with the absence of any similar valuation
80. The existing parenthetical in Section 2036(a)(1), exempting transfers involving “a bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth,” is eliminated because
the principle is already covered in Section 2043(a). See 26 U.S.C. § 2043(a) (2012) (“If any of the
transfers, trusts, interests, rights, or powers enumerated and described in sections 2035 to 2038,
inclusive, and section 2041 is made, created, exercised, or relinquished for a consideration in money
or money’s worth, but is not a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money’s worth, there shall be included in the gross estate only the excess of the fair market value at
the time of death of the property otherwise to be included on account of such transaction, over the
value of the consideration received therefor by the decedent.”).
81. An express reference to the valuation date is unnecessary because that is already provided
in the statute. See id. § 2031(a) (“The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including . . . the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible, wherever situated.”). An alternate valuation date can be elected in limited circumstances.
See id. § 2032(a) (“The value of the gross estate may be determined, if the executor so elects, by
valuing all the property included in the gross estate as follows: (1) In the case of property
distributed, sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of, within 6 months after the decedent’s death
such property shall be valued as of the date of distribution, sale, exchange, or other disposition. (2)
In the case of property not distributed, sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of, within 6 months
after the decedent’s death such property shall be valued as of the date 6 months after the decedent’s
death.”).
82. The current regulations make clear that the amount included in the gross estate will be
reduced when the scope of the property to which the interest attached is less than the entirety of the
transfer (such as a retained interest in one-half of the dividend income from stock held in trust). See,
e.g., Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (as amended in 2011). The suggested statutory provision would
apply to proportionate interests in the same fashion.
83. The amount actually included, however, may be affected by the exemptions to inclusion
provided in the suggested text (as described in Part III.A, supra): specifically, exclusion from estate
taxation when the transferor retains a qualified interest or places a residence in trust and values the
remainder interest for gift tax purposes consistently with the methodology described in Section 7520
or, alternatively, values the retained interest at zero for purposes of calculating the value of the
remainder for gift tax purposes.
84. See supra Part III.A.
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requirement in other situations involving retained interests. Congress
plainly was troubled by the outcome in Spiegel’s Estate85 (a case that
purported to require inclusion of a significant amount for estate tax
purposes notwithstanding the de minimis nature of the reversionary
interest and the absence of any affirmative step on Mr. Spiegel’s part to
retain such an interest). Congress responded by establishing a threshold
valuation requirement in which the transferred property would not be
included in the gross estate unless the value of the reversionary interest,
immediately before the transferor’s death, exceeded five percent of the
value of the property.86 A valuation threshold of this sort may (or may
not) be appropriate – but it certainly cannot be justified in one context
when other retained interests, in other contexts, are not treated similarly.
Second, the threshold valuation requirement provides relief in some
circumstances in which none is justified because it applies
indiscriminately to all situations in which the transferor retains a
reversionary interest and another person takes in the event the transferor
predeceases the event upon which the interest is contingent. These
situations include the one confronted in Spiegel’s Estate in which the
transferor did not expressly retain a reversionary interest but one was
imposed under state law.87 They also include the situation in which the
transferor expressly retained such an interest. Relief may be justified in
the former on fairness grounds but cannot be justified in the latter on any
ground. Mr. Spiegel’s estate was required to pay estate tax on the value
of the previously transferred property because of a quirk in state law and
not because of anything Mr. Spiegel affirmatively chose to do. In fact,
Mr. Spiegel presumably did not want any such interest given that he did
not retain one expressly. In contrast, a transferor who expressly retains a
contingent reversionary interest in the trust instrument should not
receive a “pass” from estate taxation simply because the actuarial value
of the interest is small.88 The absence of differential estate tax treatment
85. Spiegel’s Estate v. Comm’r, 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
86. 26 U.S.C. § 2037(a)(2).
87. Spiegel’s Estate, 335 U.S. 701.
88. This departure from existing law would probably not impose any meaningful burden
given the moribund state of Section 2037. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62. And, of
course, protection can be provided to existing estate plans by making any such change applicable
only to transfers that post-date enactment, as has been done in a variety of provisions in the estate
tax. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 2036(c) (“This section shall not apply to a transfer made before March 4,
1931; nor to a transfer made after March 3, 1931, and before June 7, 1932 . . . .”); id. § 2038(a)(1)(2) (differential treatment for inclusion within gross estate due to the presence of certain retained
powers when transfer occurs before or after June 22, 1936); id. § 2039 (annuity contracts included
in gross estate in certain circumstances but only so long as they were entered in to after March 3,
1931); id. § 2041 (differential treatment for inclusion within gross estate when creation of general
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in these radically different circumstances cannot be justified on any
principled basis. As such, the suggested text eliminates this threshold
valuation issue.89
C.

Suggested Exceptions to Inclusion from Gross Estate and Estate
Taxation

The suggested text provides three exceptions to inclusion in the
gross estate (and thus from estate taxation) even when the transferor
retains a beneficial interest in the transferred property. The exceptions
are based on the principles underlying Section 2702 and involve
situations in which a transferor can avoid estate taxation by (a) retaining
particular kinds of beneficial interests that can be valued accurately
using traditional valuation techniques based on the transferor’s life
expectancy or, in other circumstances, by (b) valuing the retained
interest at zero for purposes of determining the amount of her gift to the
remaindermen).90
In 1990, Congress enacted Section 2702 in response to certain
estate freeze techniques that allowed individuals to transfer property to
power of appointment occurred before or after October 21, 1942).
89. Transferors in Mr. Spiegel’s situation would be protected under the suggested text
because inclusion occurs only when the transferor expressly retains a contingent reversionary
interest and provides for the property to pass to another in the event he does not survive the
occurrence of the contingency. Mr. Spiegel’s estate would thus be spared from inclusion because he
did not expressly retain any reversionary interest and, instead, one was imposed as a matter of state
law. See Spiegel’s Estate, 335 U.S. at 703-04.
90. The “premium” paid by the transferor for this “insurance” against estate taxation will
frequently result in the government receiving larger payments sooner than would otherwise be the
case. It may also, on a present value basis, result in the government receiving greater aggregate
transfer tax payments than would have been the case if it received some amount of gift tax at the
time of transfer and some additional amount of estate tax following the transferor’s death. The
present system imposes immediate gift taxation on the full value of the remainder interest when the
transferor and remainderman are members of the same family while reserving the potential for
additional estate taxation should the value of the property increase between the date of the gift and
the date of death. This, of course, assumes that the property appreciates in value and that the rate of
appreciation exceeds 120% of the federal mid-term rate, the default discount rate for valuing
retained fixed payment income interests under Section 2702. 26 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2)(b); see also id.
§ 7502(a)(2). In the absence of such appreciation, the government will, at a minimum, break even
from a revenue perspective on a present value basis.
Beyond this, Section 2702 principles should be extended to other situations in which the transferor
retains a beneficial interest in trust property. Congress attempted to limit estate freeze opportunities
when it enacted this section and, by virtue of its application in the family setting alone, presumably
believed that the motivation for mischief and evasion existed among family members. As society
changes, however, the concept of traditional families changes with it, and there is not any reason to
believe that similar motivations may not exist between individuals in non-traditional settings. As a
result, Section 2702 principles should be extended beyond their current reach as suggested in the
reform proposal outlined in this Article.
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subsequent generations in such a way that the property would be valued
at an artificially low level for transfer tax purposes. This created the
possibility that some of the existing value of the property would never be
taxed, and any subsequent appreciation would also escape taxation.91
Congress responded by legislatively valuing retained interests at zero in
the family context, thus meaning that the transferor would pay gift tax
on the full value of the property at the time of the transfer.92 Section
2702 includes certain exceptions. One permits transferors to value
retained beneficial interests using traditional valuation tools (and thus
pay gift tax on a lower-valued remainder interest) when the transferor
retains a “qualified interest” – defined in Section 2702 as an interest in
which the transferor will receive an income distribution, at least
annually, on a fixed, previously determined amount or a fixed
percentage of the value of the property in trust. Another permits
transferors to value their retained interests using traditional techniques
when they transfer homes to a trust and continue to reside in them.93
Section 2702 principles, along with its exceptions, can be extended to
retained beneficial interests arising out of all irrevocable transfers and,
as a result, can lead to a fairly simple and efficient transfer tax regime.94
1. Qualified Interests
The suggested text exempts from deathtime taxation any portion of
property transferred during life in which the transferor retained a
beneficial interest that constitutes a “qualified interest” under Section
2702.95 These are interests in which the transferor-decedent receives a
91. One method used frequently in the retained interest context involved transfers of growth
ostensibly with income payable to the transferor and the remainder payable to another. The
remainder interest was valued for gift tax purposes by reducing the value of the property by the
present value of the retained interest, taking into consideration the transferor’s age and life
expectancy, and applying a discount rate based on 120% of the federal mid-term rate. This method
of valuation resulted in undervaluation of the retained interest (and thus payment of less gift tax)
because of the assumption the transferor would receive income from the property, something that
was obviously not intended or likely given the transfer of growth stock to the trust.
92. 26 U.S.C. § 2702(2)(A).
93. Congress imposed these valuation rules when the transferor and remainderman were
members of the same family; meaning, a transferor who retains an interest but ultimately intends to
benefit a non-family member at death may continue to value her interest using traditional methods
and pay the applicable gift tax based on the present value of the remainder interest.
94. A transferor who chose not to “purchase” insurance by valuing her interest at zero for
purposes of valuing the remainder for gift tax purposes, and who did not retain a qualified interest,
would subject her estate to taxation on the appreciated value of the property during the interim
between initial transfer and death. This outcome is identical to that which obtains under current law
with respect to transfers with retained interests.
95. The term “qualified interest” is defined as “(1) any interest which consists of the right to
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fixed amount each year or a fixed percentage of the property’s fair
market value as calculated each year. Congress determined that
traditional valuation methods generate reasonably accurate values in this
context and reduce (if not eliminate) the sort of manipulations that
underlie the estate freeze.96 Congress’ recognition of the propriety of
valuing retained interests of fixed amounts or fixed percentages of an
established amount in the family context97 implies that the same
approach can be used effectively outside the family context. A transferor
who retains one of these qualified interests would insulate her estate
from additional deathtime taxation even when the underlying property
continues to appreciate in value.
2. Personal Residence Trusts and Qualified Personal Residence
Trusts
The suggested text also exempts from deathtime taxation lifetime
transfers in trust of a personal residence in which the transferor retains
the right to continue living there.98 A transferor in this circumstance will
pay gift tax on the remainder interest, which will be calculated at the

receive fixed amounts payable not less frequently than annually, (2) any interest which consists of
the right to receive amounts which are payable not less frequently than annually and are a fixed
percentage of the fair market value of the property in the trust (determined annually), and (3) any
noncontingent remainder interest if all of the other interests in the trust consist of interests described
in paragraph (1) or (2).” 26 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)-(3).
96. The ordinary methodology for valuing interest is described in Section 7520, which
provides that these interests “shall be determined (1) under tables prescribed by the Secretary, and
(2) by using an interest rate (rounded to the nearest 2/10ths of 1 percent) equal to 120 percent of the
Federal midterm rate in effect under section 1274(d)(1) for the month in which the valuation date
falls.” Id. § 7520(a). The actuarial tables to which Section 7520 refers can be located at Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-7 (as amended in 2011).
97. Congress promulgated Section 2702 to combat estate freeze techniques in the family
context and expressly provided that the valuation rules described in the provision were applicable
only when the transferor made a transfer in trust for the benefit of a member of her family and she
retained for herself an interest in the trust. See 26 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (“Solely for purposes of
determining whether a transfer of an interest in trust to (or for the benefit of) a member of the
transferor’s family is a gift (and the value of such transfer), the value of any interest in such trust
retained by the transferor or any applicable family member (as described in section 2701(e)(2)) shall
be determined as provided in paragraph (2).”). Section 2701(e)(2), in turn, defines the term
“member of the family” as the transferor’s spouse, a lineal descendent of the transferor or the
transferor’s spouse, and the spouse of any such descendent. See id. § 2701(e)(1)(A)-(C).
98. The Treasury Regulations explain that these trusts can take two different forms: the
personal residence trust and the qualified personal residence trust. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5(b)(c) (as amended in 1997). The two trusts are largely indistinguishable, although the latter provides
greater flexibility than the former because the trust can hold money that can be used to maintain the
residence. For a general overview of these two types of trusts, see BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note
3, ¶ 136.4.6, at 136-62.
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house’s fair market value less the actuarial value of the retained interest.
Congress again determined that this was an appropriate method for
valuing trust property comprised of a personal residence and, as a result,
that determination should be extended to all other similar situations. A
transferor who places her home in a trust, and retains the ability to live
in it, would insulate her estate from additional deathtime taxation.
3. Optional Valuation for Gift Tax Purposes
The suggested text also exempts from deathtime taxation lifetime
transfers in which the transferor retains a beneficial interest but values
that interest at zero – meaning that she pays gift tax on the full fair
market value of the property at the time of the transfer. Having valued
her retained interest at zero for gift tax purposes, her estate would be
protected from subsequent deathtime taxation. In contrast, her estate
would be subject to potential additional estate taxation if she valued her
interest at an amount other than zero for purposes of calculating gift tax
on the remainder interest. This portion of the proposal possesses the
salutary benefit of simplicity without necessarily providing transferors or
their estates with a windfall – indeed, a choice either way in situations in
which a choice is available may (or may) not prove financially beneficial
to the transferor, to her estate or to the government depending upon how
subsequent events unfold.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current statutory scheme for gift and estate taxation of retained
interests and powers is confused and confusing. The existing statutory
provisions that apply to such interests and powers are the result of
hurried, legislative efforts to respond to judicial decisions with which it
disagreed. As a result, the existing statutory scheme represents seriatim
fixes rather than a comprehensive solution. To ameliorate this situation,
the estate tax can be (and should be) amended to provide a single, standalone provision that covers all such interests and powers and that
provides a simple, straight-forward approach to transfer taxation. Such a
provision should impose gift taxation on the full value of the transferred
property when the transferor retains a non-beneficial interest in the
property and when the transferor retains a beneficial interest but values
that interest at zero for gift tax purposes. This single reform would
establish a coherent, easy to administer scheme for transfer taxation in
this context.
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